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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-3113 
 ___________ 
 
 ZHEN FEN LIN, 
        Petitioner 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
     Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A079 301 128) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Charles M. Honeyman 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 8, 2013 
 Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: May 20, 2013) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Zhen Fen Lin petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) denying her motion to reopen her removal proceedings.  For 
the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review. 
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 Because the parties are familiar with the background, we will present it here only 
briefly.  Lin is a native and citizen of China who illegally entered the United States in 
2000.  She applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture based on her claim concerning China’s coercive 
population control laws.  In 2003, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied all forms of 
requested relief and ordered Lin’s removal to China.  In 2004, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s 
decision.  In 2006, we denied her petition for review in C.A. No. 04-3954. 
 In November 2011, Lin filed a motion to reopen her removal proceedings based on 
evidence of changed country conditions in China since the time of her original hearing.  
She asserted eligibility for asylum and withholding relief due to her fear of religious 
persecution in light of her becoming a Christian and in light of the increase in human 
rights abuses committed against members of unregistered churches in China.  Lin also 
asked the Board to reopen her proceedings sua sponte so she could provide testimony 
from her husband in support of her claim based on coercive family planning policies. 
 The BIA denied the motion to reopen, noting that Lin’s religious conversion was a 
change in personal circumstances that did not constitute a change in conditions in China 
that would overcome the time limitations for filing a motion to reopen.  Further, the BIA 
considered Lin’s documentary evidence and concluded that she had not shown a relevant 
change in conditions in China through the “extremely limited country information 
submitted.”  The BIA noted that the 1998 China Profile in the record from the previous 
proceeding did not show a significant difference “from that described in either the 
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submitted excerpt from the 2010 China U.S. International Freedom Report, or the news 
articles reporting episodes of religious repression in varying regions of China.”  The BIA 
also declined to reopen the proceeding sua sponte. 
 This petition for review followed.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252 to review the BIA’s denial of Lin’s motion to reopen, and we apply the abuse of 
discretion standard to our review.  See Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 
2002).  Under that standard, Lin must show that the BIA’s decision was somehow 
arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  See id.  Motions to reopen are reserved for 
“compelling circumstances.”  See Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 561 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 There is no dispute that Lin’s motion to reopen was untimely, as it was not filed 
with the BIA within ninety days of the BIA’s 2004 decision.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1229a(c)(7)(A) & (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  However, the ninety-day 
requirement does not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed country 
conditions arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was 
not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous 
proceeding.”  8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).  Here, Lin would have to show that she is 
eligible to file a second asylum application in reopened proceedings based on her new 
Christian faith and on changed country conditions since the time of her first asylum 
application.  See  Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 150-51 (3d Cir. 2009) (changed 
personal circumstances coupled with changed country conditions can support motion to 
reopen); Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 252 (3d Cir. 2006) (change in country 
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conditions is measured from time of proceedings before IJ).  We agree with the BIA that 
Lin did not show that the treatment of Christians in China changed since the time of her 
asylum hearing.
1
  Indeed, neither the submitted evidence nor her briefs to the BIA and to 
this Court explain how Christians were treated at the time of Lin’s hearing or any change 
that has occurred. 
 Because Lin did not meet her burden of showing changed country conditions, the 
Board did not abuse its discretion when it denied her motion to reopen as untimely.
2
  We 
therefore will deny the petition for review.  
                                                 
1
 The BIA compared the 1998 China Profile report with the evidence Lin submitted.  We 
note that that the State Department’s 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
for China is also in the record.  A comparison between Lin’s evidence and that report 
similarly shows continued problems, rather than a change.  Compare A.R. 342 (2001 
report describing crackdowns on unregistered religious groups, and “restrictions . . . 
intimidation, harassment, and detention” that “varied significantly from region to 
region”) with A.R. 77 (2010 Religious Freedom Report states:  “In some rural areas, 
unregistered churches held worship services attended by hundreds.  In other areas, local 
officials punished the same activities by confiscating and destroying property or 
imprisoning leaders and worshippers.”). 
 
2
 To the extent Lin seeks review of the BIA’s decision to deny reopening sua sponte, 
either so that she could apply for asylum on the basis of her new faith, or so that she 
could submit evidence from her husband regarding her claim concerning China’s 
coercive population policy, we lack jurisdiction.  Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 
474-75 (3d Cir. 2003). 
